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I.

Summary of Argument
The District Court correctly determined that Phoenix failed to state a

trademark claim because Basket Case’s activities cannot have caused any relevant
confusion. 1 Phoenix’s fundamental complaint is about unauthorized use of its
intangible content—karaoke tracks. Under Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), however, only confusion regarding the source of
physical goods is actionable under the Lanham Act; confusion regarding the source
of the karaoke tracks or their authorization is not actionable. Phoenix cannot avoid
Dastar just because Basket Case creates digital copies of those tracks, as Basket
Case does not sell digital files or any other physical product bearing the SOUND
CHOICE mark. Indeed, the only way consumers ever encounter Phoenix’s marks
is during playback of the karaoke tracks, so any “confusion” could only be the
result of the content itself. Dastar clearly precludes such a claim.
Nor can Phoenix avoid Dastar by pointing to other commercial services
offered by Basket Case, such as its sale of food and beverages. Basket Case does
not use the Sound Choice mark to designate any such services, and source
indication cannot be inferred from the use of Phoenix’s marks within the karaoke
tracks.

1

Phoenix acquired Slep-Tone after Slep-Tone filed its original complaint. See
Motion for Substitution of Party, March 31, 2015, R.14. For purposes of this brief,
we refer to Phoenix and Slep-Tone collectively as Phoenix.
3

Finally, Phoenix’s marks cannot be separated from the content. Phoenix
chose to embed its marks in creative works, and Dastar teaches that control over
creative works is the province of copyright law, not the Lanham Act. Accepting
Phoenix’s argument would open the door to exactly the kind of “mutant copyright”
rejected by the Supreme Court.
II.

Argument
A. Phoenix Fails to Allege Confusion Regarding the Source of Relevant
Tangible Goods, as Dastar Requires
The gravamen of Phoenix’s complaint is that, without its authorization,

Basket Case created and used digital copies of Phoenix’s karaoke accompaniment
tracks. Br. of Appellant at 5. Phoenix alleges that, because the karaoke tracks
display Phoenix’s SOUND CHOICE marks and its claimed trade dress during
playback, consumers will be confused about the origin of the karaoke tracks on
Basket Case’s computer hard drive. See Br. of Appellant at 24.
Since Basket Case does not sell its digital karaoke tracks, however, it is
implausible that consumers would be confused about their origin; indeed,
consumers almost certainly have no idea whether the tracks are being performed
from a CD or from digital copies. But even if Phoenix were right that consumers
are likely to believe that Phoenix is the origin of Basket Case’s tracks, Dastar
makes clear that any such confusion is irrelevant for Lanham Act purposes.

4

Dastar copied footage from the Crusade in Europe television series
originally released by Time-Life and re-used that footage in its own video series
without attribution to Fox (Time-Life’s successor in interest). Dastar, 539 U.S. at
26–27. According to Fox, this constituted reverse passing off. Dastar was passing
off Fox’s content as though it were Dastar’s own, thereby falsely designating the
origin of the video series in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. at 27. That
section makes actionable use of:
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
The Court held that, as used in the statute, “origin of goods” refers only to
“the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author
of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.” Dastar, 539
U.S. at 37. Thus, while the concept of origin “might be stretched to include not
only the actual producer” but the party who stood behind production of the
physical product, “origin of goods” is “incapable of connoting the person or entity

5

that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.” Id. at
31–32.2
The Court’s construction of the Lanham Act was animated by its concern
about a conflict between trademark and copyright law, and particularly its concern
that Fox might use trademark law to gain control over content for which it no
longer had copyright protection. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (“The right to copy, and to
copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired…passes to the public.”).
But Dastar’s holding is not limited to cases involving formerly copyrighted works,
or even cases in which a valid copyright exists. See Bretford Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Smith System Manufacturing Corp., 419 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v.
UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003).3
Phoenix’s claim here differs from Fox’s claim in Dastar in that Phoenix is
complaining about the use of its Sound Choice marks rather than a lack of
attribution. But that difference is immaterial under Dastar because Phoenix still
does not allege confusion about the source of any physical goods, only confusion
2

While the Court in Dastar was interpreting the language of § 43(a) specifically,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), the same rule applies in cases of infringement of
registered marks under § 32 despite that section’s slightly less specific language.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). It is well established that the principles applicable to
registered and unregistered marks are largely the same. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992); Dunn v. Gull, 990 F.2d 348, 351
(7th Cir. 1993).
3
A broader range of misrepresentations, if made in “commercial advertising or
promotion,” are actionable as false advertising under § 43(a)(1)(B). 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). There is no false advertising claim in this case.
6

about the source of the intangible creative content displayed on Basket Case’s
machines. Indeed, the Supreme Court anticipated—and rejected—precisely the
distinction Phoenix urges here. Describing the double bind in which would-be
users of creative content might find themselves if the Lanham Act were interpreted
to allow claims of false designation of the origin of content, the Court noted that if
“Dastar had simply copied the television series as Crusade in Europe and sold it as
Crusade in Europe, without changing the title or packaging (including the original
credits to Fox),” Fox likely would have brought a passing off claim. Dastar, 539
U.S. at 36. That claim would have been the same one Phoenix is making here: it
would have alleged confusion based on the credits to Fox, just as Phoenix alleges
confusion based on the inclusion of the SOUND CHOICE marks within the
content.
Far from endorsing such a claim, the Court invoked this hypothetical to
demonstrate why “origin” must be understood to refer only to the origin of tangible
goods. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (noting that adopting a definition of “origin” that
would include the origin of creative content would place “manufacturers of those
products in a difficult position”). The Court’s interpretation of “origin” ruled out
not only claims for failing to credit the creator of a work, but also claims based on
crediting the creator, “if that [crediting] should be regarded as implying the

7

creator’s ‘sponsorship or approval’ of the copy.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A).
Some Seventh Circuit cases have not been precise about Dastar’s holding.
Eastland Music Corp. v. Lionsgate Entertainment, Inc., for

example,

acknowledged that, for Lanham Act purposes, “origin” means the “producer of the
tangible product sold in the marketplace.” 707 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet
the Court did not explicitly distinguish physical copies of defendant’s movie from
the intangible creative work embodied in those copies. See id. (suggesting that “the
title of a work of intellectual property” would infringe another’s mark “if the title
falsely implie[d] that the latter author is its origin”). Thus the Court said that the
plaintiff musical group’s claim would have survived if it could plausibly have
alleged that “consumers would treat it as the producer or source of the film 50/50,
or treat Lionsgate as the producer of the 2003 album.” Id.
However, the distinction between tangible goods and their intangible content
was central to Dastar’s holding: allegations of confusion regarding the origin of
content (but not those about the origin of tangible goods) are barred. Indeed, Fox’s
claim in Dastar was precisely that consumers would be confused about who
created the content of Dastar’s movies. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (“the gravamen of
respondents’ claim is that, in marketing and selling Campaigns as its own product”

8

without attribution, Dastar falsely designated the origin of its video). 4 Fortres
Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t made the same conflation—treating Warner
Bros.’ movie, an intangible creative work, as the relevant good. 763 F.3d 696, 703
(7th Cir. 2014).5
Likewise, Gensler v. Strabala focused on whether an individual can claim to
have designed a complex architectural work, or whether instead such buildings are
team jobs that no one designs. 764 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in
original). But that question is about the origin of an intangible work—the Gensler
court even referred to Gensler’s claim as one about the origin of intellectual
property. Id. at 737. That is wrong under Dastar. Though some false claims about
actual participation in the design process might be actionable as false advertising
under §43(a)(1)(B) rather than false designation of origin under §43(a)(1)(A),6
claims regarding authorship of the intangible work are barred.

4

Eastgate should not have been able to avoid this result simply by alleging that the
title of the movie was likely to cause confusion about the physical copies of the
movie, as that allegation would simply be an attempt to evade Dastar by focusing
on irrelevant physical goods. See Section II.B.
5
The Court in Fortres Grand was considering what goods of Warner Bros. it
should compare to the plaintiff’s software product in evaluating reverse confusion.
Id. The court spoke of the relevant “goods” as the “movie,” without specifying
tangible copies thereof. Id. (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
“goods” in Dastar “likely compels lower courts to look to the movie, since it is the
junior user’s only tangible product in the marketplace about which consumers
could be confused”).
6
The Court even contemplated such a claim when it identified the ways in which
an architect’s assertion that he designed a building might be false, referring to a
9

B.

Basket Case’s Digital Files are not Relevant Goods

Phoenix attempts to avoid the Dastar problem by arguing that its marks do
designate the source of physical goods—the digital files in which the karaoke
tracks are fixed. Br. of Appellant at 13 (“The accused goods at issue in this
litigation are the media-shifted karaoke tracks stored on hard drives….”).
But Basket Case does not sell copies of the karaoke tracks to its customers,
so it makes no representation to consumers, correct or incorrect, about the source
of the physical medium in which those videos are fixed. All that Basket Case
provides to its customers is playback of the karaoke videos while they perform.
There is therefore no meaningful sense in which Basket Case uses the Sound
Choice marks “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising” of the digital files, as the statute requires. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); see
also id. at § 1125(a)(1) (requiring that the allegedly infringing mark be used “in
connection with” goods or services); N.A.A.C.P. v. Radiance Foundation, Inc., 786
F.3d 316, 324 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that “in connection with” requires a nexus
between the use and a commercial transaction, not just the presence of a mark).

case in which the “architect did not have anything to do with the design, never
having worked on the project.” Id. at 737. That type of claim should be framed as
false advertising, not false designation of origin. Gensler’s failure to distinguish
between false advertising claims under §43(a)(1)(B) and false designation of origin
claims under §43(a)(1)(A) likely explains its reference to POM Wonderful LLC v.
Coca-Cola Co.,134 S.Ct. 2228 (2014), a false advertising case, in interpreting the
statute.
10

Phoenix obfuscates by arguing that Basket Case “uses” the Sound Choice
marks not in connection with the tangible goods, but in connection with its
commercial operations more broadly. Br. of Appellant at 20. This, however, is not
a case about “use in commerce” as a jurisdictional prerequisite—it is instead about
whether Phoenix alleges relevant confusion. And on the confusion question,
Phoenix focuses on the digital tracks, suggesting that consumers will be confused
about their origin in the same way consumers are confused by counterfeit Rolex
watches. Br. of Appellant at 24–25. But that analogy is obviously flawed; watches
are tangible objects sold to consumers, whereas consumers never interact with
Basket Case’s digital files as tangible objects, only experiencing playback of the
content. Had Basket Case streamed the files from YouTube (in which case
Phoenix’s argument about the physical files would no longer apply), the gravamen
of Phoenix’s complaint would be exactly the same. (To the extent Phoenix alleges
confusion about sponsorship or endorsement of Basket Case’s bar and restaurant
services, its theory of confusion would be the same even if it had alleged that
Basket Case had purchased used CDs produced by Slep-Tone.)
Unlike the physical marking of a counterfeit watch, the only possible
representation of origin encountered by Basket Case’s consumers is in the video
content itself—through the appearance of the SOUND CHOICE marks on the
screen. Dastar, properly understood, bars any Lanham Act claim in which the

11

alleged confusion could only be the result of use of a mark within the creative
content of a work. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (rejecting an interpretation of “origin
of goods” that would include “not merely the producer of the physical item…but
also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys”).
This is true even though much expressive material is conveyed in physical
form, and so strategic plaintiffs might often claim that their case is about the source
of irrelevant physical goods. If it were otherwise, Disney could prevent others from
selling copies of Steamboat Willie even after its copyright expired by arguing that,
because Mickey Mouse is in the movie and is Disney’s trademark, consumers will
be confused about the source of physical copies of the movie. Under Phoenix’s
interpretation, that claim would survive Dastar because it is nominally focused on
the source of physical goods, even though in truth it hinges on an assertion that
consumers will think Disney authorized the reproduction of the content. This
would create precisely the sort of “mutant copyright law” the Supreme Court
rejected. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.7

7

Several recent decisions have understood that, if the plaintiff’s only claim of
confusion comes from the reproduction of the expressive content of a work, then
Dastar ought to apply, because origin cannot be inferred from the content alone.
See, e.g., Pulse Entertainment Corp. v. David, No. CV 14-4732 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2014) (Dastar barred false designation of origin claim based on explicit
misattribution of hologram to wrong creator; hologram was creative work like a
cartoon); Masck v. Sports Illustrated, 5 F. Supp. 3d. 881 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(Dastar barred false designation of origin claim based on copying of photos).
12

Some district courts in this Circuit have concluded that, in copying content
into a new format, the defendant created a new “good”—the digital track. See, e.g.,
Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Sellis Enters., 87 F. Supp. 3d 897, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
Whether or not digital files might sometimes count as goods, Dastar precludes
arguments that confusion will be caused by the content of the works fixed in those
files. Indeed, Dastar also created new “goods” in this sense—physical copies of its
videos. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27. The Court nevertheless implicitly refused to infer
from the creative content anything about the origin of those physical copies when it
concluded that Dastar had correctly identified the origin of its videos by marking
the physical copies with its own name. Dastar thus precludes arguments that the
origin of copies of creative works can be inferred from their intangible content.
C.

Dastar Bars Claims of Confusion Regarding the Origin of
Services That Are Based Solely on the Content of Creative Works

Dastar also bars claims of confusion regarding the origin of services to the
extent the alleged confusion could only be caused by the content of a creative
work. Gensler was correct that Dastar does not rule out all claims of confusion
regarding the source of services. Gensler, 764 F.3d at 736. But even if there may
be other contexts in which use of Phoenix’s marks would cause actionable
confusion regarding the source of the Basket Case’s services, such claims cannot
be based solely on allegedly unauthorized use of content. A movie theater that

13

shows a public domain movie produced by MGM cannot be subject to an
infringement claim if MGM simply alleges that the presence of the MGM lion at
the beginning of the film causes confusion about the source or sponsorship of the
theater’s entertainment services. Cf. Bretford, 419 F.3d at 580–81 (noting that
consumers might see marks embedded in other products, and holding that Dastar
bars claims based solely on that embedding). For the same reason, Phoenix cannot
succeed on its claims that consumers are likely to be confused about whether
Basket Case’s shows are sponsored by Phoenix because of the content of the
karaoke tracks.8

8

Phoenix also cannot avoid Dastar by claiming confusion about whether the tracks
or karaoke performances are “authorized.” The legitimacy of use of content is an
issue for copyright law, not for the Lanham Act. If Phoenix owns a copyright in its
tracks, it can bring a copyright infringement claim; otherwise Basket Case does not
need Phoenix’s authorization to show the videos. Fox could not have succeeded in
Dastar simply by claiming that Dastar’s use of the Fox content falsely implied that
Dastar had the right to use that material – that is the same thing, in Lanham Act
terms, as saying that the content falsely implied source. See Smith v.
BarnesandNoble.com, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-04374, 2014 BL 263099 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
23, 2014) (barring claims of false representation of affiliation between an author
and a distributor based merely on sale of copies of author’s book, even if the
distributor was distributing unauthorized copies); Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v.
Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that
Dastar bars a false affiliation claim where “one person is the publisher of a novel
and the other is the author of the novel, because the holding of Dastar would be
meaningless if a false authorship claim could be recast in this manner”).
14

D.

Phoenix’s Marks Cannot Be Separated From the Content

Phoenix’s marks cannot be separated from the creative content of the
karaoke tracks.9 For one thing, Phoenix has claimed trade dress rights in the
graphical displays of its karaoke tracks, particularly the “typeface, style, and visual
arrangement in displaying the lyrics, the style of displaying entry cues, and other
elements.” (R.20:¶46). That trade dress obviously cannot be disentangled from the
audiovisual work—it is the audiovisual work. Thus, accepting Phoenix’s claim
would conflict directly with Dastar’s holding that copyright law, not trademark
law, governs copying of expressive content.10
More fundamentally, separability is not a workable standard. Creative works
routinely contain recognizable trademarks. The owners of those marks could argue
that background uses, such as uses of Coca-Cola cans as props, should be edited
out, or that characters should be morphed to make them look different from
trademarked characters, while leaving the sequence of events the same. Given the

9

Even if the marks could somehow be separated from the content, they would not
designate the origin of any tangible good, and that is the only designation that
matters under Dastar.
10
See Ho v. Taflove, 696 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that
communicative use for expressive purposes is not the kind of use trademark law
targets), aff’d, 648 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2011); Cyber Websmith, Inc. v. American
Dental Association, 2010 WL 3075726, No. 09-CV-6198 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 4, 2010)
(holding that “the inherent misrepresentation that accompanies the unauthorized
copying and distribution of another’s copyrighted work” is not enough to create a
Lanham Act cause of action).
15

existence of powerful digital editing tools that can now be used to replace
individual elements in a work, these demands could be endless.
Similarly, prominent recording artists often include their names or
nicknames in their songs.11 Their names may be valid trademarks. Because of
statutory copyright licenses, those artists do not have the power under copyright
law to control all uses of their songs. 12 If separability were countenanced,
recording artists could nonetheless assert trademark claims, demanding that songs
be altered to remove allegedly source-identifying information.13
Phoenix chose to embed its claimed marks in expressive works in order to
bootstrap a claim to control goods into a claim to control content. If there is
confusion, it is not the kind of confusion trademark law aims to stop, and it is

11

See, e.g., EMINEM, The Real Slim Shady, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP
(Interscope Records 2000) (using both “Eminem” and “Slim Shady”); DESTINY'S
CHILD, Dot, on THIS IS THE REMIX (Columbia Records 2002) (“If something's
wrong blame it on me/B-E-Y-O-N-C-E”).
12
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110 (exempting various performances of musical works),
114(d) (providing for statutory licenses for non-interactive uses of sound
recordings); 115 (providing for compulsory licenses to make and distribute
phonorecords of musical works).
13
Indeed, artists whose names are in their works, or who claim trademark rights in
song titles or phrases, see, e.g., Kory Grow, Taylor Swift Trademarks ‘This Sick
Beat’ and Other ‘1989’ Phrases, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 28, 2015, available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/taylor-swift-trademarks-this-sick-beatand-other-1989-phrases-20150128, could create exactly the Scylla and Charybdis
problem identified in Dastar: the statutory license for musical works does not
allow a licensee to make fundamental changes to the work. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2)
(2010). Complying with copyright law would force a statutory licensee to risk a
trademark claim under Phoenix’s theory.
16

confusion of Phoenix’s own deliberate creation. Its attempt to circumvent
copyright’s limitations—given Phoenix’s apparent lack of a copyright interest in
the music tracks at issue—should not succeed. Cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New
Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Comedy III”s argument
that “the [video] clip at issue falls under the protection of the Lanham Act because
it contains elements that in other contexts might serve as trademarks”).
In fact, even assuming that consumers expected to get karaoke tracks
arranged by Phoenix, that is exactly what they got. Trademark law gives CocaCola the right to police the authenticity of its tangible goods, because a soda that is
not made by Coca-Cola is not Coca-Cola. But Phoenix does not have the right to
police the authenticity of its creative works under the Lanham Act. For that it must
rely on copyright law.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be

affirmed.
Dated: November 30, 2015

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
By: __________________________
MARK P. MCKENNA
NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL
3120 Eck Hall of Law
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
markmckenna@nd.edu
17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.
I hereby certify that, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C) and Seventh
Circuit Rule 32, this brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App.
P. 32(a)(5) and (6), because it is written in 14-pt Times New Roman font, and with
the page limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 29(d) and Seventh Circuit Rules 28.1(e)(1)
and 29(d), because it contains 15 pages of text, excluding the portions excluded
under Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

Dated: November 30, 2015

By:
Counsel for Amici Curiae

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I filed the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES on November 30, 2015, by
sending the original and fifteen (15) copies thereof by UPS to The Office of the
Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
I further certify that I served the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES on November 30, 2015, by
sending a copy thereof by UPS to the address of each counsel, as listed below:
Vivek Jayaram
JAYARAM LAW GROUP, LTD.
33 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60602
James M. Harrington
HARRINGTON LAW, P.C.
12245 Nations Ford Road
Suite 506
Pineville, NC 28134-8444
Jonathan L.A. Phillips
John T.D. Bathke
SHAY PHILLIPS, LTD.
456 Fulton Street, Suite 255
Peoria, IL 61602
____________________________
Counsel of Record

19

